BENEFITS
REGULATION-DAMAGES-TAx
FROM A TAx SHELTER WILL NOT OFFSET RESCISSIONARY DAM-

SECURITIES

AGEs-Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986).
In rescission there is no problem of computing damages.'
Limited partnership tax shelters provide investors with a
source of tax savings through tax deductions.2 When tax shelter
investors are defrauded, they can seek protection under section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,3 section 10(b) 4 of the Securi-

ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5. 5 Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides to fraudulently induced purchasers an express
I L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1010 (1983).
2 See R. HAFT & P. FASS, 1986 TAx SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK

§§ 1.01[1][a], 2.01[1]. "Tax shelters" often take the form of limited partnerships
because "income and expenses of the enterprise 'pass through' to the investors for
tax purposes, allowing them to claim allocable deductions on their personal income
tax returns." Id. at § 1.01[1][a]. Limited partnership tax shelters are sold as investment interests held for profit which fall under federal regulation as a "security" and
as such tax shelters are subject to the civil liabilities under the federal Securities Act
of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982))
[hereinafter Securities Act of 1933], and the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1982)) [hereinafter Securities Exchange Act of 1934]. See generally R.
HAFT & P. FASS, supra, at §§ 3.01-02, 3.04.
3 Ch. 38, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1982)). Under section 12(2) of this statute, the purchaser may hold the promoter
or seller liable where the offer or sale was made:
by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission ....
Id. See also R. HAFT & P. FASS, supra note 2, at § 3.04[1][b]. Seegenerally L. Loss, supra
note 1, at 1017-18 (discussing elements of section 12 cause of action).
4 Ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982)). Section 10(b) of this Act prohibits any person, directly or indirectly,
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.

Id.

5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) [hereinafter rule lOb-5]. Under rule lOb-5, any
person is prohibited in the purchase or sale of a security:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
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remedy of rescission with a return of consideration less income
received, or damages where the purchaser no longer owns the
security.6 On the other hand, SEC rule 1Ob-5 protects both purchasers and sellers of securities from fraudulent practices, 7 but
recovery under the Securities Exchange Act is limited to "actual
damages."8
Questions have arisen as to whether a defrauded investor is
entitled merely to compensatory damages for "out-of-pocket
losses" 9 or whether the remedy of rescission and restitution is
appropriate.'0 Indeed, considerable confusion has resulted.'" In
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person ....
Id. See also R. HAFr & P. FASS, supra note 2, at § 3.04[2].
6 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). The remedy for
misstatements or omissions in a prospectus or oral communication pursuant to section 12(2) of the Act allows investors "to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
Id.
7 See supra note 5.
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). Section 28(a) provides in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or equity; but
no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction ofjudgment in
one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of.
Id.
9 The measure of damages for "out-of-pocket losses," or net harm incurred,
would award defrauded buyers the consideration paid for the security less the fair
value of the security received at the time of the sale. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages
in Rule lOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1099 (1977). The out-of-pocket measure of
damages is also defined as a recovery based in tort law "for the harm resulting from
the misrepresentation itself and exclude[s] any additional harm caused by a change
in the market or some other factor that was not the proximate consequence of the
fraud." Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative
to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 351 (1984).
10 The equitable remedy of "rescission" is defined as "the act of voiding a con-

tract." Jacobs, supra note 9, at 1110. "Restitution" refers to a court's remedial action in returning the parties to status quo ante through an exchange of property.
Id. at 1114. Rescission and restitution are appropriate when "the defendant has
been unjustly enriched and should be stripped of the property he holds and of the
amounts received with respect to the property subsequent to the transaction." Id.
at 1114-15. A plaintiff may obtain restitution, however, "only if the defendant still
owns or can obtain the security on the date of thejudgment." Id. at 1115 (citations
omitted). "[W]here the defendant has intentionally defrauded a securities purchaser, public policy may favor an award of restitution, which allows the purchaser
to recover the purchase price as well as to retain any benefits derived from the
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particular, courts have differed as to whether tax benefits received by investors should be considered when calculating damage awards.' 2 Tax shelter promoters have asserted that the
transaction." Note, Austin v. Loftsgaarden: Securities Fraud in Real Estate Limited Partnership Investments-Offsetting Plaintiffs' Relief to the Extent of Tax Benefits Received, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1983).
11 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 350; L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1011-12.
Thompson observes that confusion arises out of many available measures of recovery under rule lob-5 where the courts "mix and match these measures in a way that
both obscures their substantive and historical backgrounds and creates difficulty for
subsequent courts and scholars seeking a coherent body of law . . .[and] fosters a
misunderstanding of the rule's remedy... " Thompson, supra note 9, at 350-51.
This conclusion is exemplified in the award of compensation for net harm incurred,
out-of-pocket losses, or rescission and restitution. See id. at 352. Thompson explains that the remedy under rule lOb-5 is based upon separate principles of common law tort, which limits recovery to harm and legal causation, and common law
fraud, which compensates for unjust enrichment. Id. Thompson states:
In many transactions, the tort focus on plaintiff's loss does not produce
a different result from the unjust enrichment focus on defendant's gain.
In some transactions, however, the results will not be the same. In those
cases when a different result does occur, a court's recognition of unjust
enrichment as an independent legal basis for recovery permits the plaintiff to recover the gain, even if he has not suffered an equivalent loss.
Courts that fail to distinguish the difference in the underlying rationale
improperly attempt to apply tort limitations to recoveries based on unjust enrichment. The unjust enrichment remedy, which compensates
victims of misrepresentations and also deters potential defendants from
engaging in fraudulent activity, is particularly suited to the federal securities laws that have both compensatory and deterrent purposes.
Id.
12 Compare Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985),
vacated and remanded, 106 S.Ct. 3325 (1986), decision amended, 806 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1986) and Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986); and Weinberger v. Lear Fan Corp., 627
F. Supp. 719, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (each holding rescissionary damages should be
reduced by tax benefits received) with Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d
359, 372 (4th Cir. 1986) and Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.
1984) and Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 851 (S.D. Cal. 1985) and Western
Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Western Federal Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) and Cooper v.
Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) and Wiesenberger v. W.E.
Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (each holding rescissionary damages under section 12(2) should not be reduced by amount of tax benefits received).
For cases holding the consideration of tax benefits relevant, see, e.g., Hayden v.
McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 440 (8th Cir. 1984) (tax benefits from tax shelter are
generally relevant in determining restitutional recovery); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D.
437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (production of tax returns relevant to mitigation of damages); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978) (production of tax returns relevant in determining damages in tax shelter investment);
Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (failure to consider tax
benefits calculating rescissionary award in real estate tax shelter "not realistic and is
tantamount to requesting the court and jury try this case blindfolded"); Hickman v.
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amount of tax benefits received by the investor should reduce the
amount of the damages payable.' 3 Defrauded investors, on the
other hand, have contended that tax benefits received should not
be considered in the award of damages.' 4 In Randall v. Loftsgaarden,' 5 the United States Supreme Court held that rescissionary
damages should not be offset by the amount of tax benefits received by a defrauded investor because tax benefits are not "income received" or "consideration" under section 12(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933.16

In Randall v. Loftsgaarden, four of the twenty-two persons who
had bought an interest in a limited partnership, Alotel Associates
(Alotel), alleged violation of various federal securities regulations17
against Alotel's promoter B.J. Loftsgaarden (Loftsgaarden).
Loftsgaarden intended to build and operate a Ramada Inn in
Rochester, Minnesota as a general partnership with corporate respondents Alotel, Inc., Property Development and Research
Company (PDRC), and 2361 Building Corporation, of which entities Loftsgaarden was president and sole shareholder.' 8 By organizing Alotel, Loftsgaarden expected to finance the $3.5
million venture by raising as much as $1 million by selling as
many as forty shares, each valued at $25,000, to no more than
twenty potential investors.'

9

In December 1971, Loftsgaarden circulated an initial offering memorandum which identified the limited partnership as a
"tax shelter" that would provide "significantly greater returns for
persons in relatively high income tax brackets" to attract proGroesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 780 (D. Utah 1974) (rescission not awarded due to a
two year delay in suit and receipt of tax benefits from tax shelter investment).
13 See Brief for the Respondents at 7-9, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143
(1986) (No. 85-519); Brief for Envitex Realty Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Opposition
to the Petitioners at 3, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986) (No. 85519). Envitex Realty Corp. was a defendant in Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp.,
744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986).
14 See Brief for the Petitioners at 9-12, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143
(1986) (No. 85-519); Brief Amicus Curiae of Hon Industries at 2-4, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986) (No. 85-519).
15 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986).
16 Id. at 3152. The Court also held that section 28(a) does not require "a rescissionary recovery under section 12(2) or section 10(b) to be reduced by tax benefits
received from a tax shelter investment." Id. at 3155.
17 Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Austin
I], aff'dper curiam, Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
Austin II], rev'd, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986).
18 Id. at 173.
19 Id.
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spective investors in Alotel. 20 Moreover, the memorandum specifically required that investors have a net worth of over $200,000
and be within the fifty percent federal and state income tax brackets. 2' As a tax shelter, Alotel enabled the limited partners to account for the partnership's income or loss through their
individual tax returns according to their adjusted basis in the
venture.2 2 This tax shelter was particularly appealing in that the
limited partner's basis 23 was not restricted to the actual invest24
ment, unlike non-real estate tax shelters.
Loftsgaarden was unable to attract potential investors, however, and modified the offering in May of 1973.25 In particular,
20 Id. Tax shelter promoters are required pursuant to section 12(2) and section
10 of the Securities Act of 1933 to comply with full disclosure provisions by submitting an offering document or prospectus to investors in the offering of a security for
sale. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1982) (definition of a prospectus); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j (1982) (prospectus informational requirement); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (civil
liabilities for prospectus fraud). This document must disclose the offering's risk
factors and a general partner's compensation, involvement in other competitive investments and conflicts of interests. Id.; see also R. HAFT & P. FASS, supra note 2, at
§ 4.01.
21 Austin I, 675 F.2d at 173. In a fifty per cent tax bracket, a $100 investment
would be taxed $50. McCauley, Rescissionary Awards for Securities Frauds-The Tax
Benefit Defense Does Not Work, 64 TAXES 250, 251 (1986). If this investment produces
$50 in tax deductions, the investor would effectively save that amount. Id.
22 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3146-47.
23 "Basis" of real property is defined as the purchasing cost of an asset. See
I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
24 Austin I, 675 F.2d at 174. A tax shelter normally defers taxation of gains realized until the sale of the investment. Id. The profits received would then be taxed
as capital gains or as ordinary taxable income depending upon the time period and
accelerated depreciation methods used. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1231, 1250 (1982).
Generally, taxpayers may not take tax deductions greater than their at risk
amount contributed to an activity. See I.R.C. § 465(a) (1982); 5J. MERTENS, MERTENS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 24B.01 (1987). The "at risk amount" depends
upon the yearly increase or decrease in the amount of money and property contributed to the activity. Id. at § 24B.13; see also I.R.C. § 465(b)(1) (1982).
Real estate tax shelters are unique in that a limited partner's "at risk amount"
can be increased in proportion to their share of non-recourse loans made to the
partnership. See Austin I, 675 F.2d at 173 (citing I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503(a), (b)(6) 100 Stat.
2085, 2243-44 1986)). Thus, a limited partner can deduct losses of the partnership
greater than his original cash investment. See 5 J. MERTENS, supra, at § 24B.01; see
also I.R.C. §§ 465(b)(l)(A), 465(b)(l)(B) (1982).
A partnership can artificially generate large taxable deductions through accelerated depreciation, or rental payments. See Austin 1, 675 F.2d at 173. These deductible losses or business expenses accumulated in the initial years of the tax
shelter amount to tax savings which frequently equal or exceed the amount of the
original cash investment. Id. at 174.
25 Id. Loftsgaarden's initial offering memorandum outlined potential tax saving
methods that would use rapid depreciation which would initially show large losses
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Loftsgaarden increased tax benefits and reduced the minimum
investment of the venture by lowering the amount of money to
be financed by Alotel.2 6 The revised offering memorandum projected that the venture would be profitable after three years of
losses.2 7 These changes attracted numerous individuals to invest
between $35,000 to $52,000 each in the venture during the summer and fall of 1973.28
Alotel experienced financial difficulties from its inception. 2 9
In February 1975, Loftsgaarden solicited the limited partners for
non-recourse loans to pay off debts."0 The limited partners
loaned Alotel $125,000 and hired an accountant and attorney to
investigate the partnership's finances. 3 Even with the additional
financing, Alotel was unable to meet expenses, and defaulted on
based upon a $2.31 million non-recourse loan made by the limited partners to increase each investor's basis. Id. at 173-74.
26 Id. at 174. Loftsgaarden reduced the amount to be financed by Alotel from $1
million to $700,000 by renting instead of purchasing the land upon which the motel
would be built. Id. This land rental would increase tax deductible expenses for the
individual partners while reducing the minimum investment from $50,000 to
$35,000. Id. A portion of the land would be bought by Alotel, which would then
sell the land to PDRC, a Loftsgaarden corporation, which would buy the other portion of the land, sell the entire parcel of land to another party, who would then
sublease the land back to the Alotel. Id. at 174 n.7.
27 Austin 1, 675 F.2d at 174. The second offering memorandum also indicated
that $130,000 interim construction financing would be obtained at 9.5% interest;
the land lease would be for a 40 year period with an option to renew or purchase;
profits and overhead of $103,000 would be paid to 231 Building Corporation,
Loftsgaarden's construction company; that an additional loan of $240,000 for furniture and fixtures was to be obtained at an 8% interest rate; and Alotel had obtained a firm commitment from Larwin Realty and Mortgage Trust to obtain
permanent financing at a 9.5% interest rate. Id. at 174-75.
28 Id. at 174.
29 Id. at 175. The statements in Loftsgaarden's offering memorandum were
knowingly false. Id. The interim construction loan and fixture and furniture loans
were obtained at rates 3 to 4% higher than the prime rate. Id. The interest rate on
the $2.31 million non-recourse loan rose from 8 to 9.5%. Id. at 175 n.13. In addition, Loftsgaarden and his corporations expected an estimated compensation of
$240,000 rather than the $103,000 fee as was specified in the offering document.
Id. at 175. The land lease was obtained for only fifteen years with a renewal option,
not a purchase option as expressed. Id. The construction time was underestimated
by five months. Id. Moreover, the Larwin Realty Mortgage and Trust did not guarantee permanent financing. Id. Instead, it only provided Alotel with financing
through an intermediary who was able to pay higher interest rates due to the Minnesota usury laws which prevented an interest rate above 8% for non-corporate
entities. Id. at 175 n. 12. To make matters worse, construction and operating costs
were higher than budgeted and the motel occupancy was lower than predicted. Id.
Finally, the additional sale in October 1974 of another five units of Alotel at
$175,000 failed to sustain the venture. Id. at 176.
30 Id. at 175-76.
3' Id. at 176.
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its loans and rental payments.3 2
To recover their investments, disgruntled investors filed suit
in the Minnesota District Court in 1976.7 At trial, a jury found
that Loftsgaarden's memoranda contained numerous false statements. 4 Accordingly, the jury held Loftsgaarden liable under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 3 5 section 10(b)3 6 and
SEC rule lOb-5,3 7 as well as various state law provisions. 3 The
district court granted the petitioners full rescission for the section 12(2) violation.39 In calculating damages, however, the district court refused to admit evidence regarding tax benefits
received by the limited partners as a result of their investments,
reasoning that the investors would have benefited from other tax
40
saving ventures if they had not been defrauded.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment
against Loftsgaarden for violations under sections 12(2) and
10(b), but reversed and remanded the judgment as to the rescissionary award.4" The court of appeals affirmed the lower court
ruling that rescissionary damages were appropriate under section
12(2), but determined that the defrauded investors' recovery
should be reduced by the amount of tax benefits gained from
their investment.4 2 The court of appeals declared that the award
of rescissionary damages recoverable under both sections 12(2)
Id. The motel was foreclosed by creditors in 1978. Id.
Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3147.
34 Id.
35 Id.; see § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (civil
liability for fraud in the offer and sale of a security).
36 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3147. See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting deception in purchase or sale contravening SEC rules and regulations).
37 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3147. See SEC rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987)
(prohibiting deceptive practices in purchase or sale of securities).
38 Id. The investors raised the state law claims under section 1 of the Minnesota
Uniform Securities Act, MINN. STAT. § 80A.01 (1978), as well as common law fraud,
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. at 3147 (No. 85-59).
39 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3147. See supra note 6 for text of damages under section
12(2).
40 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3147. The investors were awarded damages equalling
consideration paid plus prejudgment interest. Id. at 3147-48. The court noted that
petitioners could only be awarded a single recovery. Id. at 3147.
41 Austin 1, 675 F.2d at 173. See also Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3148. The court of
appeals rejected Loftsgaarden's argument that the remedy of rescission was unavailable to the petitioners because the investment was not tendered until shortly
before trial. Austin I, 675 F.2d at 179.
42 Austin I, 675 F.2d at 181.
32

33
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and 10(b) should be reduced by the amount of actual damages. 4"
In rejecting the district court's rationale, the court of appeals asserted that the receipt of tax deductions are an appealing characteristic of tax shelters and constitute "something of value" which
must be considered when calculating damages.4 4
On remand, the district court calculated damages by subtracting the net tax benefits from the purchase price paid with
simple interest.4 5 After both parties appealed the damage award,
the court of appeals reconsidered the case en banc.4 6 In a per
curiam decision, the court of appeals reaffirmed that under section 12(2) or section 10(b) the award of rescission or rescissionary damages should be offset by the amount
of tax benefits
47
received by a defrauded tax shelter investor.
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals declared that
under section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a defrauded investor should not be permitted to recover damages in
an amount greater than the damages sustained.4 a Relying on the
express language of section 28(a), the court reasoned that
"actual damages" should be construed to limit rescission or restitutional damages under section 12(2). 49 In measuring rescission43 Id.

The court of appeals referred to the "actual damages principal" which

under section 10(b) would require rescissional or restitutional recovery to be reduced by actual damages under rule lOb-5, section 12(2) and state law remedies.
Id. The court defined "actual damages" to include the reduction of a defrauded
investor's recovery by "any value received as a result of the fraudulent transaction."
Id. (quoting Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978)). In Garnatz, where a fraudulently induced
purchaser of securities sued under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the court noted
that the application of compensatory, out-of-pocket losses for rescissionary damages was not required. Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361.
44 See Austin 1, 675 F.2d at 182. The court of appeals noted that the strict compensatory nature of damages require the value of the tax benefits to be taken into
account when determining damages of a defrauded investor. Id. at 183.
45 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3148. See infra note 58 for a comparison of the awards.
46 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3148; Austin H, 768 F.2d at 946. In Austin H the court
considered whether the Austin I panel correctly limited section 12(2) rescissionary
damages to "actual damages" as applied in section 28(a) and calculated the measure of rescissionary damages. Id. at 954.
47 Austin H, 768 F.2d at 953-54.
48 Id. at 954. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). See supra note 8 for text of section
28(a).
49 Austin H, 768 F.2d at 954. See also Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d
935, 940 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986). In Austin I,
the court of appeals noted that although "actual damages" does not appear in the
Securities Act of 1933, the remedies provided under section 12(2) were "substantially equivalent" to the damages under section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 954. The court reasoned that the recovery provided by both acts limits an award to a return of status quo ante whereby plaintiffs
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ary damages under section 12(2), the court of appeals further
maintained that the receipt of tax benefits should be considered
"income received ' 50 and a return of consideration although conceding that tax benefits are not income "in a strict accounting
sense. '" 5 1 Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the defrauded investors in effect did not receive any tax benefits due to
the operation of the tax benefit rule.5"
The court of appeals also ruled that reducing damages by
the amount of tax benefits did not unjustly enrich Loftsgaarden. 53 The court reasoned that Loftsgaarden did not retain the
consideration paid by the investors because the money was invested in the venture.5 4 Furthermore, the court observed that
civil remedies under the federal securities acts and state laws only
compensate injured parties and do not penalize defendants. 55 Finally, by not reducing the defrauded investors' recovery by tax
benefits gained, the court noted that the government was not denied the tax revenues of the investors recovery. 56 The court explained that the venture did follow the tax code criteria which, if
favorable to Loftsgaarden, was successfully designed to promote
cannot recover an amount greater than their net economic loss or actual damages
sustained. Id.
50 Austin H, 768 F.2d at 955. The court of appeals explained its decision in Austin I as holding that income received under the rescissionary remedy of section
12(2) should include "all economic benefits bargained for and received" due to the
"strictly compensatory nature of damages." Id. (quoting Austin 1, 675 F.2d at 183).
In addition, the court of appeals stated it had held that tax benefits received by
investors were not a "return of consideration" paid to Loftsgaarden. Id. at 958.
51 Austin 11, 768 F.2d at 955. In Austin II, the court noted that "the economic
reality" of tax benefits is that their receipt is a "primary motivation behind the investment and resulted from Loftsgaarden's efforts in structuring and operating the
partnership to take advantage of the relatively complicated tax rules." Id. The
court of appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff did in fact receive tax benefits and
rejected the investors' argument that prior tax benefits gained were illusory due to
the possible recapture of gain upon the sale of the hotel. Id. The court explained
that any recapture would have occurred due to the hotel's foreclosure. Id. Moreover, the investors' tax returns were audited and thereupon closed. Id.
52 Id. The court stated that the tax benefit rule did not necessitate the elimination of the tax benefits received, but required an inclusion in income in a subsequent tax return for the recovery received. Id. See infra notes 107, 143 (discussing
tax benefit rule).
53 See Austin 11, 768 at 956.
54 See id.
55 Id. In the absence of pendant state fraud claims, recovery under the federal
securities acts excludes punitive damages. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 471 (1985); see also infra note 183.
56 Austin 11, 769 F.2d at 956. The Internal Revenue Service may tax recover'
received by the investors as income received. See id.
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economic development.57 Thus, in calculating damages, the
of losses, not
court of appeals applied an out-of-pocket measure 58
investors.
the
by
paid
consideration
of
amount
the
Two dissenting circuit judges, Chief Judge Lay and Judge
Bright, urged that the tax benefits gained by a defrauded investor
had no relationship to a rescissionary award. 59 As the majority
conceded that the receipt of tax benefits are not income, the dissent pointed out that the statutory language of a section 12(2)
could only be reduced by income received, not tax beneaward
fits. 6 0 Further, the dissent criticized the majority for providing
the fraudulent party with a windfall by deducting tax benefits received from the recovery. 6 '
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.6 2
The Court held that tax benefits are not "income received" or
"consideration" under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
and should not offset a rescissionary damage award; furthermore,
the Court ruled that such an award need not be reduced under
Act of 1934, which limits
section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
63
compensation to "actual damages."

The remedial provisions for fraud under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 provide investors with an express private
Id. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (discussing this rationale).
Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3149. The investors award was reduced by the tax benefits gained because they were in a fifty percent income tax bracket in which the
damage award plus prejudgment interest was doubled. See id. at 3149; see also Austin
II, 768 F.2d at 960-61. The district court's award to the investors, without a reduction by tax deductions taken, ranged from an amount of $64,610 to $96,385 each.
The court of appeal's award to the investors, with the reduction, ranged from an
amount of $506 to $18,790 each. See Austin II, 768 F.2d at 961.
59 Austin 11, 768 F.2d at 962 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 962-63 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The dissent explained that tax savings
are speculative depending upon an individual's tax bracket or available tax deductions. Id. at 963. Thus, tax benefits, the dissent advanced, are not a real savings,
but a deferral of taxation. Id. The dissent stated that the taxation of an investment
is deferred until its sale at which time "the taxpayer must return to the government
tax benefits gained .... " Id.
62 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3149. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to the
"importance to the administration of the federal tax and securities laws, and because the courts of appeals are divided in their treatment of tax benefits for purposes of calculating damages in federal securities fraud litigation." Id.
63 See Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3152, 3155. The Court also rejected the Eighth
Circuit's detailed calculation of damages. Id. at 3154. The majority explained that
such tax benefit determinations are too speculative to be submitted to the jury, and
unduly burdensome to require Loftsgaarden to discover the investors' tax history.
57
58
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remedy. 64 An investor who relies upon misstatements or omissions made in the offer or purchase of a security is entitled to the
remedy of rescission and restitution.65 To invoke the remedy of
rescission and restitution, the investor tenders the investment in
exchange for consideration paid. 66 If the investor no longer
owns the security, then the investor may recover rescissional
damages. 67 In both situations, section 12(2) provides that the recovery will be reduced by "any income received" on the
investment.6 8
On the other hand, the remedial provisions provided by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule
lOb-5 provide investors with an implied cause of action for fraud
in the purchase and sale of securities; however, the choice of an
appropriate remedy is left to the courts. 69 The primary damage
provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 28(a),
limits an award to "actual damages" sustained and the calculation of this recovery is left to the courts' discretion.70 Traditionally, courts have awarded investors in SEC rule lOb-5 actions
See supra note 3 for liability provisions of section 12(2).
65 Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1979). In awarding plaintiff
shareholders damages under section 12(2), the Second Circuit recognized the
"statutory right to rescission." Id. at 1035. See generally L. Loss, supra note 1, at
1016, 1022.
66 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). See supra note 6 for damage provision of section 12(2).
The Second Circuit directed that "rescission can only take place if the plaintiff gives
back the stock he has received, and therefore a demand for rescission contains an
implicit offer to tender, sufficient to satisfy the statute." Wigand, 609 F.2d at 1035.
67 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2). See supra note 6 for damage provision of section 12(2).
Where a plaintiff no longer owns the security, section 12(2) allows recovery for
rescissional damages in the amount of "the difference between the purchase price
and the plaintiff's resale price, plus interest, and less any income or return of capital (with interest) that the plaintiff received on the security." L. Loss, supra note 1,
at 1020. The term "rescissional" damages has been used interchangeably with
"restitutional" damages. 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB5, 11-61 n.4 (1987). "Restitutional" damages would include windfall damages in
addition to rescissional damages. Id.
68 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). See supra note 6 for damage provision of section 12(2).
69 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 350, 355-56. An implied private right of action
under rule lOb-5 was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The implied private right of action is widely recognized
in the district and circuit courts. T. HAZEN, supra note 55, at 488. The Supreme
Court stated, "a private right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule
lOb-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of
this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). The Supreme Court, in fact, acknowledged the
permissibility of raising an implied section 10(b) and rule lob-5 claim where an
express remedy existed under the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 387.
70 See supra note 8 for text of section 28(a).
64
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"out-of-pocket" losses in which the investor is returned the difference between the consideration paid for the investment reduced by the fair value received at the time of the purchase.7 1
Investors, however, may also be awarded rescission and restitu7 2
tion under SEC rule lOb-5 actions.
Although damage awards under section 10(b) are normally
limited to out-of-pocket losses, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed an award of damages in excess of a defrauded investors'
net economic harm in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States. 73 In
Affiliated Ute, shareholders brought suit under SEC rule lOb-5 for
the fraudulent sale of securities."4 The Court ruled that the appropriate measure of damages is out-of-pocket losses under section 28(a). 75 Explaining that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
71 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 1099. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (awarding difference between fair value received and what
would have been received if there was no fraudulent conduct); Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 745
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (all awarding difference between
price paid and value received). One explanation for the courts' predominant use of
an out-of-pocket measure of damages for rule lOb-5 actions is the remedy's tort
basis in law. Thompson, supra note 9, at 355. Although neither section 10(b) or
rule lOb-5 expressly provides for a specific measure of damages, the violation of a
statute's mandate is a tortious action. Id. at 355 n.18. See also Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ("The disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort.").
72 The Eighth Circuit noted that an out-of-pocket measure of losses was "not a
talisman" in light of the court's "function to fashion the remedy best suited to the
harm." Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). The Eighth Circuit recognized plaintiff's recovery
under a section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 action for rescission and restitution or rescissionary damages where the security was previously sold. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951. See generally Jacobs, supra note 9,
at 1109.
73 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
74 Id. at 139-41. In Affiliated Ute, the Court consolidated two cases. Id. In one
case, members of the Ute Indian tribe brought suit against the United States to
redistribute mineral interests among shareholders and to determine whether Affiliated Ute Citizens Association should manage property interests. Id. at 139-40. In
the other case a rule lob-5 action was raised against the bank, individual bank employees and United States for the fraudulent sale of Ute Distribution Corporation
stock to non-members in violation of the corporation's articles of incorporation. Id.
at 139-41. Although the first suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the second
suit was affirmed in part, and reversed as to the finding of damages. Id. at 156-57.
75 Id. at 156. In calculating the measure of damages, the court of appeals found
damages to be the resale profits made by the defendant or "the prevailing market
price at the time of the purchase from the plaintiffs," when there was no resale or if
resale was made "not at arms length." Id. at 154 (citation omitted). The Supreme
Court, affirming the district court's determination, held the correct measure of
damages according to section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
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was created to deter fraud and to encourage full disclosure to
investors, the court declared that the statutory remedy should
not be construed "technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. "76 With this in mind, the Court
affirmed an award of damages which exceeded out-of-pocket
losses when the defendant "received more than the seller's actual
loss." 7 7 In that instance, the Court sustained damages in an
amount equal to the defendant's profit.7 8
The United States Supreme Court discussed the economic
value of tax deductions in a securities fraud claim in United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman.7 9 In Forman, purchasers of shares of
stock in a housing cooperative alleged securities fraud on the
part of the developer. 80 The Supreme Court dismissed the claim,
however, because the shares were not a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts. 8 ' In reaching its deciU.S.C. § 78bb(a), to be the "difference between the fair value of all that the ...
seller received and the fair value of what he would have received if there was no
fraudulent conduct." Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
76 Id. (quoting Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
77 Id.
78 Id. The Court relied upon Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), where a defrauded purchaser recovered damages equal
to the defendant's profit. Id. TheJanigancourt asserted that "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls then to let the fraudulent party keep them." Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
79 421 U.S. 837, reh'g denied sub nom. New York v. Forman, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
80 The respondents, residents of Co-op City, brought a derivative action against
the developers for violations of fraud primarily under the Securities Act of 1933,
§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b); and rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. Id. at 844-45. The fraud claim was
based upon increases in rental cost after defendants had indicated in the offering
memoranda that developers would absorb any increases in cost. Id.
81 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-52. Despite the fact that the co-op apartments
were called "shares," the Court noted that the cooperative shares fail to be a security within the Securities Act of 1933 as a matter of "economic reality." Id. at 848
(citing Tchereprin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967)). The Court pointed out
that the shares sold lacked a security's most common feature of providing "dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." Id. at 851 (quoting Tchereprin, 389 U.S. at 339). The Court also stated that the shares lacked other
characteristics of a security such as negotiability, ability to be pledged, attachment
of voting rights, and appreciation in value. Id. at 851.
The Court similarly rejected the shares as being within the definition of a security. See id. at 852-53. The Court defined a security as "an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852. The Court defined
profits to be a return on investment from "capital appreciation" or a "participation
in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds." Id. at 852 (citations omitted). The purchase of the apartment shares in Co-op City was observed by the
Court to be conditioned upon the eventual sale of the apartment at original cost
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sion, the Court rejected the argument that the investors received
an expectation of income in the form of tax deductible mortgage
interest from the cooperative shares.82 Moreover, the Court
stated that there was no authority to support the proposition that
tax benefits are a form of income.83
Federal courts of appeals are divided on the question of
whether tax benefits gained by a defrauded investor should be
deducted in calculating rescissionary damages. 84 For example, in
Burgess v. Premier Corp.,

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-

cuit declined to reduce rescissionary damages to account for
prior tax benefits gained on the theory that the investors' recovery would be later subject to taxation. 6 In Burgess, investors in a
corporation which raised cattle herds as a tax shelter brought suit
under federal and state securities laws.8 7 In calculating damages,
the Burgess court ruled that subtracting tax benefits from the investors' damage award was inappropriate because doing so
would fail to restore the investors to status quo ante.88
The Burgess court noted that the reduction of damages to acthus denying plaintiffs a profit. See id. at 854. The Court concluded that plaintiffs'
inducement to purchase the "shares" was to acquire low-cost housing and not to
make a profit. See id. at 852. Upon concluding that shares purchased in a housing
cooperative are not securities within federal securities laws, the Supreme Court dismissed the action for lack of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 859-60.
82 Id. at 855.
83 See id. The Court articulated in a footnote that, "[elven if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would not be associated with a security investment since they do not result from the managerial efforts of others." Id. at 855
n.20 (citation omitted).
84 See, e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 1986)
(rescission under section 12(2) should not be reduced by tax benefits received);
Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (1985) (damages should be
offset by tax benefits received), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3325 (1986), decision
amended, 806 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1986); Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp., 744 F.2d
935, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1984) (rescissionary award should be reduced by tax benefits),
vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986); Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423,
440 (8th Cir. 1984) (tax benefits from tax shelter generally relevant in determining
restitutional recovery); Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 837-38 (9th Cir.
1984) (rescissionary damages should not be offset by tax benefits); Western Federal
Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Western Federal Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) (rescission award
should not be reduced by tax benefits taken).
85 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984).
86 Id. at 838. The court indicated that because the issue of plaintiffs' tax liabilities was not before the court, it could not disallow prior tax benefits. Id. Further,
the court "presumed that the IRS [would] do its duty," should plaintiffs fail to file
amended tax returns upon recovery. Id.
87 Id. at 830. The plaintiffs brought suit under section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j and under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See id.
88 Id. at 838.
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count for tax benefits would effectively place the cost of a defendant's fraud upon the government, which would be denied
revenue from taxing the investors' recovery. 89 The court also
maintained that the defrauded investors would not receive a
"double recovery," but would have to pay taxes on the recovery
as income received by filing amended tax returns." Finally, the
court noted that consideration of tax consequences is only applicable to non-taxable personal injury awards where there were
prior tax benefits claimed.9 1
In contrast to the Burgess decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ruled in Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp.9 2 that
tax benefits gained from a tax shelter investment should be deducted when calculating rescissionary damages. 3 In Salcer, limited partners in a real estate tax shelter sued the general partners
for rescissionary damages for failure to disclose material information in violation of Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) and
SEC rule lOb-5. 04 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit
indicated that section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 limits recovery for fraud to actual damages sustained. 5
The court defined "actual damages" under section 28(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act as "compensatory damages" and thus
precluded plaintiffs from recovering more than the net economic
loss suffered. 9 On that basis, the Second Circuit concluded that
"[i]t is not within our power to ignore benefits bargained for and
received by plaintiffs as a result of the transaction at issue, which
represent real economic value mitigating any loss they may have
suffered." 9 7
The Salcer court reasoned that the pursuit of tax advantages
was one of the prime motivations for selecting a real estate lim89 Id.
90 Id. The court noted that any economic advantages from prior tax deductions

would be "illusory because amended returns will have to be filed under the tax
benefit rule." Id. (citation omitted).
91 Id. The court indicated that prior tax deductions are relevant in determining
recovery in premature death actions and in personal injury awards which are not
taxed as a matter of law. Id. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
92 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986).
93 See id. at 940-41.
94 Id. at 936-37. The plaintiffs' $77,500 investment per unit was jeopardized
when increased building costs forced a sale of each unit at a $47,500 loss. Id. at
937-38.
95 Id. at 939.
96 Id. at 940.
97 Id.

1988]

NOTES

139

ited partnership investment. 9 8 Because the defendants' misconduct in Salcer only affected the income realized from the
investment, the Second Circuit concluded that the investors had
in effect retained the full tax benefits bargained for in the investment. 99 Thus, the court explained that the investors would be
entitled to damages equal to the amount of their initial investment diminished by tax benefits received. 0 0 The Second Circuit
posited that to hold otherwise would confer upon the investors
0
an undeserved windfall.' '
Significantly, the Salcer court rejected the Burgess court's reasoning. 0 2 The Salcer court first disputed the Burgess court's view
that reducing damages to account for tax benefits would cause
0 3
the government to be the banker for fraudulent tax shelters.1
The Second Circuit observed that the government, by offering
tax incentives to encourage housing development, obviously preferred residential development to the tax which they otherwise
0 4
would be entitled.1
The Salcer court also declined to follow the rationale asserted
in Burgess that the tax benefits gained by the investors were "illusory" due to the application of the tax benefit rule.' 0 5 The Second Circuit recognized that the tax benefit rule applies only in
cases of actual rescission, such as in Burgess,' 0 6 where the recovery award is taxed to restore the parties to status quo ante. 0 7 In
98 Id. The court indicated that tax sheltered investments are higher in price than
future growth investments due to expected tax benefits. Id. (citing 4 R. HAFT & P.
FASS, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS,
99 Id.
100 Id. at 941.

8-9 (3d ed. 1981)).

101 Id. at 942.
102
103
104

Id. at 941-43.

Id. at 941; see Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838.
Salcer, 744 F.2d at 941.
105 Id. at 942. Cf Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. The Salcer court maintained that the
calculation of damages without consideration of tax benefits would confer upon the
plaintiffs an "undeserved windfall." Salcer, 744 F.2d at 942. From the plaintiffs'
investment of $77,500 per unit, the plaintiff has received $97,866 ($30,000 from
the forced liquidation and $67,866 in tax savings), and would receive an additional
$47,500 in damages (an investment return of $77,500 minus $30,000 received from
liquidation), for a total of $145,366 return on the investment. Id.
106 Id. at 943. See Burgess, 727 F.2d at 837. In Burgess, the plaintiffs could be
awarded full rescission since the fraudulent party could repurchase the cattle. See
id. In Salcer, however, the defendants would have to repurchase the plaintiffs'
shares in the apartment complex. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. Thus, the plaintiffs in
Salcer could only obtain rescissionary damages in the amount of the investment loss
due to the forced sale. Id.
107 Id. The tax benefit rule applies when "a taxpayer who claims a deduction
resulting in a tax benefit for one year and then later obtains a recovery or repay-
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the instances where rescissionary damages are awarded, as in
Salcer, the court pointed out that the tax benefit rule is inapplicable because the award would not be inconsistent with the inves-

tor's prior tax deductions.1 8 The Second Circuit asserted,
moreover, that the investors' receipt of tax benefits could not be
ignored simply because the Internal Revenue Service might challenge their past tax deductions at a later date.109
Against this background of Supreme Court decisions and divergent circuit court views, the Court rendered its opinion in
Randall v. Loftsgaarden. In Randall, a majority of the Court first
examined the applicability of section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933 in applying the remedy of rescission." 0 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that section 12(2) imposes civil liability for material misstatements or omissions in a
prospectus and provides a private right of action for defrauded
investors."' Justice O'Connor stated that a rescission award
under section 12(2) would provide for a return of consideration
paid plus interest, less the income received from that investment.l" 2 The Court also observed that when a defrauded invesment that is inconsistent with the premise underlying the deduction must include
the recovery in ordinary income." Id. (citing Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983)). In a case of actual rescission, the plaintiffs would
be placed in the same position as if they did not invest in the tax shelter scheme.
See id. Thus prior tax deductions taken are considered inconsistent with actual rescission recovery and the tax benefit rule operates to tax this recovery as includable
in ordinary income. Id. See infra note 143 (discussing tax benefit rule).
108 Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. The Salcer court stated:
It would not be a return of the plaintiffs to the same position they would
have occupied if they had never made the investment but merely an
award of damages after crediting them with their tax benefits. In short,
the "tax benefits doctrine" does not dictate the district court's decision
but depends for its applicability upon the substance of that decision. To
hold as the government urges would put the cart before the horse.
Id. Moreover, the Salcer court explained that the correct application of the tax benefit rule would not require plaintiffs to amend their prior tax returns to eliminate
past deductions, but to report the recovery award as income. Id.
109 Id. at 942. The Salcer court stated that plaintiffs were required to show a present indication that the tax benefits taken would be recaptured by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. The Tax Division argued that prior tax benefits should not be
calculated into rescissionary damages since tax benefits are subject to recapture by
the IRS upon sale of the investment and are taxed as ordinary income which cancel
out tax benefits. Id. at 943. The court held that since each apartment was sold at a
loss, the IRS recapture provision was inapplicable. Id. Thus recapture, triggered
upon the sale of the investment, would tax the gain as ordinary income. Id.
110 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3149.
l 11 Id. See supra notes 3 & 6 for text of section 12(2).
112 Randall, 106 S.Ct. at 3149 (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1933)).
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tor no longer owns the security, section 12(2) also allows the
investor to recover rescissionary damages upon the sale of the
security or after the security has been sold.' 13
In determining whether tax benefits gained from a tax shelter investment constituted "income received" within section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the majority first examined
the language of the statute. 1 4 Justice O'Connor concluded that
a plain language reading of section 12(2) did not include tax benefits received by the defrauded investor to offset income received
because tax benefits "cannot, under any reasonable definition be
termed 'income.' ""' The majority maintained that tax deductions or tax credits received by owners of a security have no independent value in themselves apart from the benefit derived
from tax deductions or credits reducing an investor's tax burden."'16 The majority supported this proposition by referring to
the Internal Revenue Code, under which receipt of tax deductions is not income as defined by the Internal Revenue Code.' 1 7
113 Id. The Court noted that where the claimant no longer owned the security
actual rescission would be impossible. Id. Justice O'Connor asserted, however,
that rescissionary damages will be awarded where "the plaintiff is entitled to a return of the consideration paid, reduced by the amount realized when he sold the
security and by any 'income received' on the security." Id.
114 Id. at 3150. The petitioners contended that section 12(2) does not include tax
benefits received as a part of income and should not offset the rescissionary award.
Id. at 3149-50.
115 Id. at 3150. The Court explained that the statutory language of section 12(2)
allowing for an offset for "income received" was sufficiently clear and not contrary
to the surrounding legislative history to require a literal reading. Id. Cf Adalman
v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit noted
that if Congress intended to include tax benefits as an offsetting factor under section 12(2), Congress would have used the phrase "benefits received" and not "income received." Id.
116 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3150. Justice O'Connor stated:
Unlike payments in cash or property received by virtue of ownership of
a security-such as distributions or dividends on stock, interest on
bonds, or a limited partner's distributive share of the partnership's capital gains or profits-the "receipt" of tax deductions or credits is not
itself a taxable event, for the investor has received no money or other
income within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
Id.
117 Id. In particular, the Court cited I.R.C. § 61 (1982). Section 61(a) provides in
relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived, including:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
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The majority also relied upon United Housing Foundation v.
Forman in determining that the economic benefits of tax deductions from the security are not income under section 12(2). 118
The Court recognized that in Forman, deductible mortgage interest was neither income nor profit for purposes of section
12(2)."t
By analogy, therefore, the majority reasoned that a limited partner's entitlement to tax deductions did not constitute

income.120
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that tax benefits are income received and should offset recovery under the
common law definition of rescission. 12 1 Justice O'Connor observed that Loftsgaarden failed to cite any common law authority
in support of the proposition that a rescissionary remedy would
take tax benefits into account. 1 22 In addition, the majority held
that this common law argument conflicted with the plain language of section 12(2).123 The Court also rejected this argument
based on the "direct product rule."' 1 24 The Court stated that
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11)
Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income.
Id. Justice O'Connor concluded, "we would require compelling evidence before
imputing to Congress an intent to describe the tax benefits an investor derives from
tax deductions or credits attributable to ownership of a security as 'income received
thereon.' " Id.
118 United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, reh'g denied sub nom. New York
v. Forman, 423 U.S. 884 (1975). See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
119 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3150; Fornan,421 U.S. at 855. See supra text accompanying note 82.
120 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3150.
121 Id. The respondents alleged that the remedy of rescission should merely restore petitioners to status quo ante. Id. The respondents defined rescission as returning to the other party whatever was "received under the contract in the way of
money, property, or other consideration or benefit." Id. at 3150-51 (quoting 2 H.
BLACK, BLACK ON RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION OF WRITEN INSTRUMENTS, § 617
(2d ed. 1916)). Loftsgaarden argued that the receipt of tax benefits constituted
such "other consideration or benefit" under principles of rescission at common
law. Id. at 3151.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. The Court observed that under the direct product rule: "[T]he party
seeking rescission was required to credit the party against whom rescission is
sought only with gains that were the 'direct product' of the property the plaintiff
had acquired under the transaction to be rescinded ..... Id. The majority defined

1988]

NOTES

although tax benefits are generated by an investment, tax deductions must be combined with other income to produce an economic benefit.' 2 5 Thus, the Court concluded that tax deductions
would not be a direct product of the investment at common
law. 126
The Court also rejected Loftsgaarden's argument that Congress intended the rescissionary remedy of section 12(2) merely
to restore an injured party to status quo ante.' 27 The Court recognized that section 12(2) was also intended to deter fraud and
encourage full disclosure. 128 With this in mind, the Court declared that the rescissionary remedy of section 12(2) provides
"an additional measure of deterrence" and is not merely com29
pensatory in character. 1

Concluding its economic evaluation of tax deductions under
section 12(2), the majority affirmed the court of appeals ruling
that tax benefits could not be considered "a return of, or reduction in consideration."' 3 0 The Court articulated that a return of
consideration "must be confined to the clear case in which such
money or property is returned to the investor," and not the tax
benefits derived from the investment. 13 1 Thus, the Court held
that section 12(2) does not permit offsetting of "tax benefits redirect product as "that which is derived from the ownership or possession of the
property without the intervention of an independent transaction by the possessor."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 157 comment b (1937)). The direct
product rule operates to offset from a rescission award those gains which are a
direct product of the property in question, and not a gain arising from an independent transaction by the owner. Id.
125 Id. The Court also indicated that Loftsgaarden failed to overcome the plain
language of section 12(2) and prove that Congress intended to limit the effects of
the direct product rule under that section. See id.
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 Id. The Court inferred that the rescissionary remedy under section 12(2) was
also designed to deter fraud and encourage full disclosure from the legislative history. Id. The majority stated that the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 included the prevention of "further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless security through misrepresentation [and] to place adequate and true information before the investor." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
129 Id.
130 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S.
Ct. 3143 (1986) (No. 85-519)); see also Austin I, 768 F.2d at 958. The Supreme
Court noted that the legislative history regarding "consideration" in the context of
section 12(2) constituted money or property given in return for the security, not tax
deductions. Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3151-52. Thus, any offsetting for a return of
consideration received is limited to money or property. Id.
131 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3151-52.
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ceived by a defrauded investor against the investor's rescissionary recovery, either as 'income received or as a return of
'consideration,' and that this is so whether or not the security in
13 2
question is classified as a tax shelter."'
The Court next addressed whether its interpretation of section 12(2) should be modified in light of the remedial provisions
of sections 28(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.133 The majority rejected the respondent's argument that
13 4
section 28(a) should be read in pan materia with section 12(2).
The Court pointed out that section 28(a) had previously been
construed as limiting the application of other remedies only to
bar an award of punitive damages. 3 5 The Court observed, however, that section 12(2) specifically applies to prospectus fraud
which is not addressed in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.136
Therefore, the Court reasoned that to narrowly construe section
12(2) within the bounds of section 28(a) remedies would partially
repeal section 12(2) by implication, a construction which is disfavored. 1 37 With this in mind, the Court held that there was no
irreconcilable conflict between section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933 and section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that Congress did not intend to replace provisions of the
13
1933 Act with provisions of the 1934 Act.'
Id. at 3152.
Id. See supra note 8 for text of section 28(a).
134 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3152. Loftsgaarden advocated affirmance of the court of
appeal's decision that the damages awarded in private securities fraud actions are
strictly limited to actual damages and thus require that the value of tax deductions
be used to determine the extent of losses sustained. Id. He argued that section
28(a), which limits section 10(b) awards to "actual damages," should be construed
to limit section 12(2) awards. See id. Loftsgaarden contended that the "actual damages" principle includes "anything of economic value received . . . as result of the
investment" to diminish the investors' award. Id. Thus, damages under section
12(2) should be reduced by tax benefits gained according to Loftsgaarden's construction of section 28(a). See id. Inparimateria is defined as "upon the same matter
or subject." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, statutes in pari
materia should be construed together. Id.
135 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3152 (citing Globus v. Law Research Ser., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)). In Globus, section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act was construed to be in pari materia with section 28(a) of the 1934 Act
and consequently barred the application of punitive damages. Id. The Randall
Courtdistinguished the Globus decision, however, because the Globus complaint was
filed under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which makes no reference to
damages. Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3152 (citing Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 7 7q(a) (1982)).
136 Id.
137 Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)).
138 Id.
132
133
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The Court next examined its interpretation of section 12(2)
in light of provisions for rescissionary damages in section
10(b).' 39 The majority observed that if a rescissionary recovery
were to be applied in the case at bar, the amount of tax benefits
received by the defrauded investor should not be deducted from
the amount of recovery under section 12(2) or under section
10(b).' 14 Rather, the Court refused to apply section 28(a) in a
manner that would "impose a rigid requirement that every recovery on an express or implied right of action under the 1934 Act
must be limited to the net economic harm suffered by the plaintiff.' 4 1 In support of its position, the majority cited Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, where the Court permitted defrauded investors to recover damages in an amount equal to the defendant's profits in a section 10(b) action on the theory that doing so
would prevent unjust enrichment.' 4 2 The Court declared that
the defrauded investors in Randall would not receive a windfall,
but a reduced net economic gain due to the applicability of the
tax benefit rule.1 43 On this basis, the Randall Court chose not to
limit the investors' rescissionary recovery under section 28(a) despite the fact that they may be placed in a better position than
status quo ante.' 44 The majority maintained that the legislative
intent behind sections 12(2) and 28(a) was not merely to com139 Id. The Court noted that section 10(b) provides primarily for "out-of-pocket
losses" equal to the difference between the fair value received and the fair value the
defrauded party would have received if there had been no fraudulent conduct. Id.
at 3152-53. The majority noted that damages are awarded at a court's discretion
and some courts have allowed plaintiffs to choose between rescission, where possible, and out-of-pocket losses. Id. at 3153. See also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
909 (9th Cir. 1975) (under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions the trial court may
choose to award actual rescission or consequential damages), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976). See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing election of
remedies).
140 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3153.
141 Id.
142 Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing Affiliated Ute).
143 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3154. The tax benefit rule requires the taxation of a
rescission award as ordinary income. See id. See also Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The tax benefit rule applies in those instances
where an event occurs which results in a disallowance of a prior deduction. Id. at
389. In Hillsboro, the Court explained that where a claimant took prior tax deductions for losses and then recovered those losses in an award, the application of the
tax benefit rule would then tax the recovery award as ordinary income. Id. at 389
n.24. See also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 (1931) (rejecting
taxpayer's argument that recovery under a lawsuit offset earlier net losses and
should not be included in income).
144 See Randall, 106 S.Ct. at 3154.
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pensate defrauded investors, but also to deter fraudulent disclosure practices.1 45 The Court also reasoned that limiting
defrauded investors' recovery solely to net economic loss by deducting tax benefits gained from recovery would
hamper the de46
terrent function of the federal securities acts.'
The majority opinion concluded by rejecting Loftsgaarden's
argument that the rescissionary award should be reduced by the
tax benefits gained because of the economic reality that individuals seek investments in tax shelters for tax benefits. 1 47 The majority observed that tax deductions are not considered bargained
for assets because they are inseparable from the underlying investment. 148 The Court stated that tax deductions are not assets
created by the seller of the securities. 149 With this in mind, the
court declined to treat tax benefits as property created by the
promoters of tax shelters which would have to be accounted for
in calculating a rescissionary damage award. 5 °
Although the majority failed to directly resolve the issue, the
Court did note in dicta that where a plaintiff delays filing a section 12(2) fraud action in order to maximize full tax deduction
potential from the investment, it may be appropriate to offset the
award by tax deductions taken.' 5 ' Justice O'Connor recognized
that judges in section 10(b) cases have declined to award rescissionary damages and applied out-of-pocket losses where plaintiffs delayed raising suit or selling their investments in order to
seek greater loss in market value.' 5 2 Further, the Court an145 Id.
146

Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
The effect of allowing a tax benefit offset would often be substantially to
insulate those who commit securities frauds from any appreciable liability to defrauded investors. The resulting diminution in the incentives
for tax shelter promoters to comply with the federal securities laws
would seriously impair the deterrent value of private rights of
action ....

Id. (citing Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2628
(1985)).
147 Id. Loftsgaarden asserted that the receipt of tax benefits should be treated as
"an important tangible economic advantage," and thus should be considered in
calculating damages. Id. See also Salcer, 744 F.2d at 940.
148 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3155. The Court noted that tax deductions are not
freely assignable and are personal to the investor. Id. (citing New Colonial Ice Co.
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)).
149 See id.
15o
151
152

Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1037 (1970)). See Thompson, supra note 9, at 369-70.
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nounced that it did not decide whether a plaintiff, who brings suit
solely under section 10(b), may be free to choose between rescissionary or out-of-pocket losses. 153 The majority also stated that
it did not reach the question of whether courts "may ever refuse
to allow a rescissionary recovery under section 10(b) where the
'premium' for expected tax benefits represented a large portion
measure
of the purchase price, in which event the out-of-pocket
' t 51
recovery."
smaller
significantly
a
might yield
Justice Blackmun concurred in a separate opinion to address
of "why it may be proper to take tax benefits into acissue
the
count in a case brought solely under section 10(b) and rule
10(b)-5."' 155 Justice Blackmun stated that the measure of allowable damages under section 10(b) is limited to "actual damages"
under section 28(a). 15 6 While Justice Blackmun observed that
"out-of-pocket losses" are the proper measure of damages pursuant to section 10(b), he reiterated that this provision does not
explicitly set out a specific method of calculating damage
awards.' 5 7 The Justice maintained that when rescission is
granted under section 12(2), tax benefits should not offset recov-

ery. 158 Justice Blackmun asserted, however, that where the investor's expectation of tax benefits are a major inducement to invest,
tax benefits received should be taken into account when calculating a section 10(b) remedy.' 59 Justice Blackmun advanced that

there are two distinct types of fraudulent conduct with regard to
tax shelters where a promoter will either make false representations as to the amount of the potential tax benefits or as to the
value of the underlying asset.' 60 Justice Blackmun noted that
Loftsgaarden did not misrepresent the level of potential tax benRandall, 106 S. Ct. at 3155.
Id. (quoting Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 946 n.5 (1984)).
The rescissionary measure of damages was determined proper within Randall since
Loftsgaarden failed to challenge the investors' request for the award. 106 S. Ct. at
3155.
155 Id. at 3156 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
156 Id.
157 Id. Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that rescissionary damages may
occasionally be appropriate. See id. (citing 106 S. Ct. at 3152-53).
158 Id. at 3156 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
159 Id. Justice Blackmun stated that in order to calculate out-of-pocket losses,
reference should be made to the elements of the purchase price of the tax shelter
which include: (1) underlying assets, (2) potential income stream, (3) capital appreciation, (4) and tax write offs. Id.
160 Id. See, e.g., Laster v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 757 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1985) (consideration of recovery for lost tax benefits as breach of contract damages); Sharpe
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982) (separating the calculation of investment loss and lost tax advantages).
153
154
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efits to be gained by investors but misrepresented the profitability of the venture. 6 ' Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the value of the investment price paid to receive tax benefits
62
should not be considered when calculating damages.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for not reducing the defrauded investors' section 12(2) award
by the amount of tax benefits bargained for and received.' 6 3 Justice Brennan contended that the majority should not have relied
on the Internal Revenue Code definition of income." 6 TheJustice commented that common law theories of income and equitable restitution should have been applied in interpreting section
12(2) because Congress relied upon common law principles in
16 5
drafting that provision.
Justice Brennan indicated that the application of a common
definition of rescission and restitution would require the investors' award to be reduced by the tax benefits bargained for and
received from the investment.' 6 6 Justice Brennan pointed out
that the remedy of rescission should not place a plaintiff in a better position than before entering the agreement. 167 Thus, Justice
Brennan advanced that rescission and restitution at common law
would not allow investors to keep the full value of the transaction
bargained for and recover the full amount of consideration

paid. 168
Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3156 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3156-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
noted that the investors were only misled as to the investment's profitability, and
not to the amount of tax benefits to be derived from the investment. Id. at 3156.
Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that the investors' recovery should be limited to the amount of the investment attributable to the underlying asset. Id.
163 Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161
162

164
165
166

Id.

Id.
Id. at 3158 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted the common law
definition of restitution restores the parties to status quo ante where the "plaintiff
must return to the defendant the subject of the transaction, plus whatever else he
may have bargained for and received under the contract by way of money, property,
other consideration or benefit, and the defendant must return to the plaintiff the
consideration furnished to the plaintiff, plus the value of any other direct benefit
the defendant received from the bargain, such as interest." Id. (citing 2 H. BLACK,
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 617, at
1485-87 (2d ed. 1929); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 114 (1964); 1 G. PALMER, LAW
OF RESTITUTION §§ 3.9, 3.11-.12 (1978); Thompson, The Measure of Recover , under
Rule lOb-5: A Restitutionary Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 366,
369 (1984)).
167 Id. (citing 3 H. BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS,

168

§ 617, at 1487-88 (2d ed. 1929)).

Id. Justice Brennan emphasized that an investor primarily bargains for and
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The dissenting Justice also disputed the majority's conclusion that the definition of income under section 12(2) excluded
tax benefits.' 6 9 In making this assertion, Justice Brennan relied
upon the common definition of income which defined income as
a gain or benefit derived from capital or labor. 170 Justice Brennan perceived tax benefits to be a monetary benefit directly generated from a tax shelter investment and thus constitute
income. 7 ' Furthermore, the Justice declared that the Securities
Act of 1933 did not require a definition of income similar to the
Internal Revenue Code, nor did the act reject the common
1 72
definition.
The Randall v. Loftsgaarden decision involves considerations
of tax, remedies for securities fraud, and the calculation of damages. In Randall, the Court addressed the apparently conflicting
remedies of rescissionary and out-of-pocket damages to be
awarded under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and redamages previsolved this dilemma by noting that rescissionary
1 73
ously have been awarded under both acts.
Clearly the Supreme Court's primary justification for holding that the recovery in a rescissionary award should not be offset
purchases a tax shelter for the tax benefit, and "[i]t would be ignoring reality to
maintain that the economic benefit that flows to an investor from a tax shelter investment is not as direct a benefit of his bargain as are dividends that flow from a
securities investment." Id.
169 See id. at 3158-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 3159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 610 (9th ed. 1983)).
171 Id.
172 Id. Justice Brennan stated, "I think that a fair reading of Congress' intent was
simply to provide for rescission and restitution, and not to carve out, to the exclusion of all other forms of value that flow directly from a securities transaction, only
income as defined by the tax code .... " Id.
173 The court ignored the problem of conflicting remedies as addressed in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), in which the Court adopted a
cumulative construction of the securities acts to provide recovery under section
10(b) where express remedies were available under section 11. In Randall, the
Court was faced with the issue of whether to limit recovery under section 12(2) in
light of the limitation of recovery under section 10(b) to actual damages. Randall,
106 S. Ct. at 3152. The Randall Court did echo Huddleston by stating that courts
have awarded rescissionary awards under section 10(b). 106 S. Ct. at 3153. See
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 385-86. The Huddleston Court announced that: "[F]ederal
courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed under § 10(b)
even where express remedies under § 11 or other provisions were available. In
light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave
§ 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b)
action." Id.
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by tax benefits was to deter fraud. As a matter of public policy,
allowing the victims of fraud to recover an amount which places
them in a better position than the status quo ante is preferable to
reducing the amount of compensation a fraudulent party must
bear.' 74 Otherwise, the defendant will have committed the "perfect fraud" where damages recoverable would be swallowed up
by the tax benefits gained by the plaintiff.'75 Thus, the affirmation of Austin I and the reduction of rescissionary damages by tax
benefits gained would have dissuaded investors in tax shelters
from bringing fraud actions.
It may be argued that permitting a defrauded investor to retain tax benefits would tend to encourage such persons to delay
commencement of an action until all tax deductions have been
exhausted. Justice O'Connor noted in dicta, however, that where
plaintiff forestalled a section 12(2) suit in order to receive full tax
benefits, a trial court would have the discretion to reduce recovery by the amount of tax benefits taken. 176 The Justice also explained that under a section 10(b) action where tax benefits
recovered by the investor represented a "large portion of the
purchase price," out-of-pocket losses may be awarded. 17 7 This
decision, therefore, does not foreclose defendants from raising
the defense of tax benefits in order to reduce the amount of
damages.
The effect of tax benefits realized by investors may be
greater than anticipated by the Supreme Court in that the tax
benefit rule may not always be applicable.'
There is speculation as to whether the plaintiff who recovers rescissionary dam174 McCauley, supra note 21, at 250. By saving the defendant any amount in the
return of the investment price, such as the reduction of the rescission award by tax
benefits, the promoter/defendant of the tax shelter would be left with an amount
greater than he possessed at the time of the transaction, thus violating the goal of
rescission. Id. at 251.
175 "Perfect Fraud" Results from Tax-Offset Rule, SEC Commissioner Says, JOURNAL OF
AccOUNrANCv, May 1986, at 29 (quoting Address by Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Annual Southern Securities Institute). The Commissioner advocated a reversal of Austin H and Freschiv.
Grand Coal Venture, "to correct serious misinterpretations of both the securities and
tax laws." Id. Commissioner Grundfest observed that the "tax-offset" rule, which
reduces a defrauded investor's award by tax benefits taken, "so severely reduce[s] a
plaintiff's recovery, that even if a promoter concedes he defrauded the investor, no
damages will be awarded." Id.
176 Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3155. See supra text accompanying note 151.
177 See Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3155. See also supra text accompanying note 154.
178 One commentator noted that the damages received by the plaintiff could escape taxation because of the availability of other deductions or credits. Note, Tax
Shelters As A Security: The Use Of Tax Returns In A lOb-5 Action, 14 FORD. URBAN L.J.
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ages for fraud must file an amended tax return or has a current
inclusion in income due to the application of the tax benefit
rule. ' 79 The application of the tax benefit rule is triggered whenever the rescissionary recovery becomes fundamentally inconsistent with prior deductions. Controversy continues, however,1 as
80
to what constitutes "fundamental prior inconsistencies."
Moreover, commentators have noted that the application of the
tax benefit rule to rescissionary damages may not apply, or alternatively, the recovery may receive capital gains tax treatment. 18,
If the recovery is taxable as capital gains in whole or in part, the
plaintiff could receive a "substantial net economic benefit." '82
This places the award of damages in such situations precariously
on the edge of awarding more than compensatory damages,
83
which approach the level of punitive damages.
259, 277 (1986). The commentator added that, "[t]he possibility of future taxation
is too remote to disregard the fact that tax benefits already have been received." Id.
179 See Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. See also supra notes 107-08. This award may be
taxed in the year of receipt and does not require the amending of tax returns. See
Banoff, The Supreme Court Holds Tax Shelter Benefits Do Not Offset Rescission Damages, 65
J. TAX'N 210, 212 (1986); see also Hall v.Johnson, 758 F.2d 421,424 (9th Cir. 1985);
Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 943 (2d Cir. 1984); Rev. Rul. 8058, 1980-1 C.B. 181-82; Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84-85 (all note recovery is
included in income in year of receipt); but cf. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d
826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984); Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D.
Ariz.) (a taxpayer must include recovery in amended tax return), aff'd sub nom.
Western Federal Corp. v. Erickson, 73 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984).
180 See Banoff, supra note 179, at 213. Banoff noted that there is no guidance to
decipher what are inconsistent prior tax deductions since the area is "virtually underdeveloped and causes puzzlement." Id.
181 McCauley, supra note 21, at 251. The defrauded investor's receipt of a rescissionary award may be taxed as "a sale or exchange." Id. See also Rev. Rul. 80-58,
1980-1 C.B. 181. A sale or exchange of property would be taxed as capital gain.
McCauley, supra note 21, at 251-52. See also I.R.C. §§ 741, 751 (1982). "A payment
in settlement of a suit for rescission of a sale of stock, on the ground that it was
induced by fraud, was held to represent payment for the stock, resulting in a capital
gain and not ordinary income." 4 J. MERTENS, supra note 24, § 22.93, at 631 (footnote omitted). Depending upon how the plaintiff has taken previous deductions on
the investment, if the plaintiff has reduced his basis to zero via previous deductions,
then subsequent recovery is taxable when received according to the tax benefit
rule. Banoff, supra note 179, at 212. Plaintiff may be awarded different tax treatment according to whether he deducted the investment in full as "a worthless security or as a theft loss." Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(3), (e) & (g) (1982).
182 See Banoff, supra note 179, at 212. Banoff noted that the capital gain treatment would defer gain until the receipt of the award and "would provide [an] additional benefit, when coupled with the transmutation of ordinary losses into capital
gains." Id.
183 Punitive damages are not recoverable under the federal securities acts. H.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 2503, at 610 (1986-87 ed.). See also
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286-87 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). In Globus, the Second Circuit observed: "[T]o permit
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The Randall Court's premise for preventing the unjust enrichment of plaintiffs who have taken tax deductions is dependent upon future actions of the Internal Revenue Service. 8 4 In
instances where defrauded tax shelter investors recover a rescissionary award under section 12(2), it is incumbent upon the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether the plaintiff has
filed an amended tax return to correct prior inconsistencies in tax
deductions or has a current inclusion in income due to the operation of the tax benefit rule.18 5 Therefore, it is at the Internal Revenue Service's discretion to determine the extent of the
86
plaintiff's eventual recovery.
The Randall decision is also significant in that it resolves the
conflict in the circuit courts as to whether the amount of recovery, not reduced by tax benefits gained, constitutes a windfall to
the plaintiffs. 1 8 7 The majority's examination of the receipt of
"windfall" damages differs from prior applications. Generally,
windfall damages are a remedy for defrauded sellers, which allows them to recover the buyer's profits from the resale. 8 8 Thus,
the awarding of windfall damages disgorges a defendant's profits
to prevent unjust enrichment. 18 9 In the Randall decision, the
Court has expanded the remedy of windfall damages to apply to
defrauded buyers. 90 In this regard, the Court has made a conscious decision to provide defrauded investors, rather than defendants with the windfall.
In granting certiorari, the majority emphasized the "imporpunitive damages under the 1933 Act would create an unfortunate dichotomy between the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits punitive
damages in actions brought under that Act." Id. (footnote omitted); Cf. Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 329, (punitives allowed only where there is a
pendant state law claim), rehg. denied, 642 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1985).
184 See Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3154. The majority reasoned that "[a]ny residual
gains to plaintiffs thus emerge more as a function of the operation of the Internal
Revenue Code's complex provisions than of an unduly generous damages standard
for defrauded investors." Id.
185 See id.
186 The Salcer court noted that to justify a court decision in part by the future acts

of the Internal Revenue Service would be "putting the cart before the horse."
Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943. See supra note 108 (discussing Salcer).
187 See Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3153-54.
188 SeeJacobs, supra note 9, at 1121.
189 See id.
190 Cf. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-02 (2d Cir.) ("The
reason why the remedy has been applied for the benefit of defrauded sellers but not
of buyers is not any decisive legal difference but the difficulty generally confronting
the defrauded buyer in showing that the fraudulent seller has in fact reaped such a
profit."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
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tance to the administration of the federal tax and securities laws"
in the application of section 12(2) and l0b damages and the need
to resolve the division in the courts of appeals as to the significance of tax benefits in calculating damages.' 9 ' The Court, however, never referred again to the administration of federal tax
and securities laws or how these statutes are to interact. Instead,
the Supreme Court uniquely adopted the Internal Revenue
Code's definition in interpreting the phrase "income received"
within the federal securities act. 192 Whether the framers of the
securities act had the same intent in defining income as is specifically defined in the Internal Revenue Code may not be a valid
assumption. Justice Brennan's assertion that the majority should
have referred to the common definition of income may indeed be
more appropriate. 193
Regardless of the fact that a securities investment is a tax
shelter, the Randall decision generally sets out the proposition
that tax benefits gained by a defrauded investor may not offset a
rescissionary award under section 12(2). The Court held that tax
benefits are excluded from the definition of "income received"
and "a return or reduction of consideration" under the section
12(2) remedy of rescission. Thus a defendant who wishes to offset the amount of rescission or rescissionary damages under a
section 12(2) award by a return of consideration will be confined
to an investor's return of money or property. The Court, however, did provide that under section 10(b) actions, tax benefits
may be considered when calculating awards. Therefore, defendants are not precluded from asserting that tax benefits received
by a defrauded investor should offset damage awards.
Analisa F. Sama
19' See Randall, 106 S. Ct. at 3149.
192 The Securities Act of 1933 does not define the term income received. See 15

U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
193

Statutory construction of well-defined common law words and phrases in stat-

utes may apply in common-law definitions, "even in statutes dealing with new and
different subject matter to the extent that they appear fitting and in the absence of
evidence to indicate contrary meaning." 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONSTR.
§ 50.03 (4th ed. 1984).

